The debate over new provinces, additional administrative units, devolution of power and the very nature of Pakistan’s system of governance has once again begun to occupy centre stage in the country’s political discourse. At first glance, these may appear to be separate questions. In reality, however, they converge on one fundamental issue: what kind of state, administrative structure and constitutional order does Pakistan need for the decades ahead?The question has assumed greater significance because Pakistan can no longer afford a weak, indecisive or institutionally fragmented state. The changing regional environment, pressures on both eastern and western borders, terrorism, economic constraints, domestic political instability and rapidly shifting global power equations have made strong decision-making, continuity and institutional coordination indispensable—not merely for national security but for effective governance itself.The present political configuration, with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif leading the federal government, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar carrying important responsibilities, Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir occupying the country’s senior military position, President Asif Ali Zardari and PML-N leader Muhammad Nawaz Sharif remaining central to political consultations, and Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi playing an increasingly active role, reflects a political and administrative environment in which the country’s principal centres of decision-making can no longer be viewed in isolation from one another.
This raises a fundamental question: does Pakistan need merely a stronger establishment, or does it need a stronger state? In my view, the answer is unequivocally the latter. Strong defence and national security institutions are essential components of state power, but they cannot be a substitute for the state itself. A strong state also requires effective political institutions, an empowered Parliament, meaningful local government, a balanced judicial system, economic stability and, above all, constitutional supremacy.Recent constitutional and legal developments must likewise be examined within this broader context. The creation of the office of Chief of Defence Forces and subsequent legislation concerning the command structure of the armed forces have been presented by the government and its supporters as responses to the requirements of modern warfare, joint command and faster decision-making. Critics, meanwhile, have raised legitimate questions about concentration of power and the nature of civilian oversight.Both perspectives deserve consideration. Pakistan needs neither a weak defence establishment nor an ineffective state. But the strength of a modern state cannot be measured by military capability alone. The real test will be whether defence preparedness, political stability, economic resilience, constitutional governance and public confidence can reinforce one another.
It is against this larger backdrop that the debate over new provinces should also be understood.The real question is not how many provinces Pakistan should have. The more important question is how effectively, fairly and promptly the state can reach its citizens. Where a province becomes so geographically vast, densely populated or administratively complex that effective governance becomes difficult, the creation of a new administrative unit may deserve serious consideration. But if new provinces merely create new capitals, new bureaucracies and new political centres, the map may change without governance actually improving.In Punjab, demands for separate administrative arrangements for South Punjab and Bahawalpur have existed for decades. In Sindh, Karachi’s administrative and political status carries its own exceptional sensitivity. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the demand for a Hazara province and the administrative consequences of the merger of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas remain important considerations. Balochistan presents a fundamentally different challenge because of its enormous geographical expanse, sparse population, dispersed settlements, mineral wealth, security concerns and persistent development imbalance.Thus, the nature of the problem differs from one part of Pakistan to another. The solution, however, must ultimately be measured against a national standard.Karachi deserves particular attention in this debate. Its administrative history is complex. It became the federal capital territory in 1948, was incorporated into West Pakistan under the One Unit arrangement in 1955, and returned to Sindh following the restoration of the provinces in 1970. Any discussion about Karachi’s future administrative or political status therefore needs to take this historical evolution into account rather than viewing the issue solely through the lens of present-day political alignments.At the same time, the demand for a separate province in Karachi cannot simply be dismissed, nor should it be reduced to a matter of political loyalty or framed as something that can only be answered before a historical political leader.
The aspirations of Karachi’s people deserve to be examined on their own constitutional, administrative and democratic merits.Gwadar, too, must be discussed in the light of historical facts. Pakistan purchased Gwadar from Oman in 1958 and incorporated it into Pakistan that same year. It was subsequently made a district of Balochistan in 1977. Any discussion of Balochistan’s future administrative configuration should therefore avoid creating the impression that Gwadar was incorporated into the province through some recent administrative decision. Its extraordinary geographical, economic and strategic importance, however, makes Gwadar highly relevant to any serious discussion about Pakistan’s future federal and administrative architecture.Khyber Pakhtunkhwa faces its own set of challenges. The issue is not simply one of provincial boundaries, but of administrative access, the consequences of integrating the former tribal districts, Hazara’s distinct regional identity and uneven development. Likewise, if new administrative units are considered in Balochistan, the debate must balance geography, population, resources, security requirements and meaningful local representation.The constitutional position of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, however, cannot be placed on exactly the same footing as proposals for new provinces elsewhere in Pakistan. Their present status is intrinsically linked to the historical and international dimensions of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.Yet another reality cannot be ignored. India’s unilateral constitutional and administrative actions in occupied Jammu and Kashmir since August 5, 2019, and the changed circumstances that followed, have inevitably generated fresh debate about the future political, constitutional and administrative arrangements of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.Simply repeating the constitutional terminology of the past is no longer sufficient. Pakistan’s principled position—that the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute must reflect the aspirations of the Kashmiri people—should remain intact. At the same time, the political, economic and administrative rights of the present generation cannot indefinitely be made contingent upon an eventual settlement whose timing remains uncertain.
This is where an interim political arrangement deserves serious consideration.If granting full provincial status to Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan is considered inappropriate at present because of Pakistan’s principled position on the final settlement of Kashmir, does that necessarily mean that the people of these regions should remain without meaningful representation in Pakistan’s Parliament? Can their voice not be given a more effective constitutional role in national policy-making on matters that directly affect them?Such representation would not constitute a final determination of their constitutional status. It could instead provide an interim political framework under which the people of these territories receive appropriate representation in the National Assembly and Senate, participate in relevant national policy-making and enjoy a constitutionally recognised voice at the federal level.Proposals of this nature have been discussed before. Given the changing regional and constitutional circumstances, they deserve to be revisited with seriousness rather than being dismissed as incompatible with Pakistan’s position on Kashmir.The question of resources can no longer be postponed either. Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan should not remain dependent merely on federal discretion or annual development packages. They require a permanent, transparent and predictable fiscal mechanism. The National Finance Commission could provide one possible avenue, even if constitutional and legal experts have to devise an interim formula that accommodates the existing constitutional complexities while taking into account population, backwardness, geographical difficulties, border and defence responsibilities and development needs.The guiding principle should be clear: political representation and access to national resources must not be treated as substitutes for the final settlement of Kashmir, but as instruments of interim political and administrative justice.
Such an approach would neither compromise Pakistan’s principled position nor leave the people of these territories feeling that their present-day concerns have been sacrificed to an uncertain future.The same principle applies to Gilgit-Baltistan. Its people, like citizens elsewhere, need meaningful participation in decisions affecting their political, economic and social future. Any future constitutional arrangement must therefore seek a balance between representation, resources, regional identity and Pakistan’s principled position on the Kashmir dispute.A broader vision emerges from this debate: Pakistan’s federal structure may eventually need to move beyond the traditional conception of four large provinces towards a more flexible, balanced and genuinely multi-layered federal system. The existing provinces may continue in their present form; new administrative units may be created where justified; interim political and fiscal mechanisms may be developed for AJK and GB; and local governments may finally be empowered in the true sense of the word.Any increase in the number of provinces would naturally have implications for the federal Parliament. If one chamber continues to provide representation broadly according to population while the other functions as a genuine federal chamber giving balanced representation to the constituent units, the federal equilibrium can be preserved even if new provinces are created. In this context, the Senate should be strengthened as a true federal institution rather than remaining merely the second chamber of Parliament.But this brings us to the most important question: does Pakistan actually need more provinces, or does it need empowered local governments?For the ordinary citizen, the most immediate government is not the Prime Minister, Chief Minister or Governor. It is the government responsible for the neighbourhood, union council, tehsil or district. Roads, water supply, sanitation, drainage, basic healthcare, schools and local development are ultimately local concerns. If power and financial resources remain concentrated in Islamabad or provincial capitals, the creation of additional provinces alone will not necessarily bridge the distance between the citizen and the state.Pakistan therefore needs neither unrestrained centralisation nor centrifugal politics that weakens national cohesion and security. A strong centre remains indispensable for defence, foreign policy, national security, currency and major national projects. But the devolution of authority for public services, local development and everyday governance is equally indispensable.The renewed echo of a presidential system must also be examined within this broader debate. If weaknesses in the parliamentary system, governmental discontinuity and difficulties in decision-making have revived discussion about a presidential model, the question should not be approached merely through the experience of past military regimes or the personalities of contemporary politicians.The real question should be: which system can make Pakistan more stable, effective and accountable while remaining acceptable to its federating units and consistent with constitutional democracy?If the presidential system ever becomes a serious constitutional proposition, it must not be conceived simply as a stronger centre confronting weaker provinces. It would have to be accompanied by clear distribution of powers, effective parliamentary oversight, judicial checks and balances, provincial autonomy, empowered local governments and meaningful public accountability.Equally, the parliamentary system should not be treated as sacrosanct merely because it constitutes the existing constitutional arrangement. Its strengths must be preserved, but its weaknesses must also be addressed.Ultimately, the questions of new provinces, presidential or parliamentary government, a stronger security establishment, empowered local governments and interim representation for AJK and GB all lead to one larger question:What kind of strong state does Pakistan want to become?In my view, Pakistan needs a state that is strong in defence, effective in decision-making, resilient and self-reliant economically, clear and consistent constitutionally, accountable through Parliament, stable in its political institutions, close to its people through empowered local government, and capable of giving every region a genuine sense of political and economic justice.If new provinces genuinely serve an administrative necessity, they should be considered. If the same objectives can be achieved by empowering local governments within existing provincial boundaries, that option should receive priority. If the people of AJK and GB can be provided interim political representation and a fairer share in national resources without prejudicing Pakistan’s principled position on Kashmir, that avenue should be explored with an open mind. And if a presidential system is ever seriously considered, it should be judged not by personalities but by institutions, constitutional safeguards and the national interest.The real need, therefore, is not simply to draw new lines on the map. It is to redefine the meaning of effective statecraft.Pakistan needs strong defence institutions, but it also needs strong political institutions. It needs a strong centre for national security, but empowered local governments for effective public governance. It needs national unity, but that unity must be reinforced by political representation, economic justice and constitutional confidence.
Changing maps may be relatively easy; bringing people together is far more difficult.Pakistan’s future will not be determined merely by how many provinces it has, or whether its system remains parliamentary or becomes presidential. The more consequential decision will be how the state balances national security, constitutionalism, institutional authority, democratic representation and economic justice.Perhaps that is why the current echo of new provinces is not merely a debate about the number of provinces. It is a knock at the door of Pakistan’s constitutional and state future.The question now is whether that knock will open the way to a new national direction—or merely prove to be another echo of the political season.
